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FISCAL YEAR 1985 EMBASSY SECURITY SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZATION

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FISCAL YEAR 1985 EMBASSY SECURITY SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORIZATION

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., presiding.

Present: Senators Mathias and Biden.

Senator MATHIAS. The committee will come to order.

The committee has been concerned for a long period of time over the problem of security of diplomatic establishments maintained by the United States in various parts of the world. I have been in touch with the chairman of the committee for nearly a year with respect to this very serious problem.

It has, of course, been most graphically illustrated by the tragic events in the Middle East, but the problem of security for diplomatic establishments is by no means limited to the Middle East.

We, of course, are all saddened by the vicious bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in East Beirut on September 20, but that is merely one more episode in this difficult and tragic story.

We are meeting today to look at the broad problem of Embassy security, not just in the city of Beirut, by any means, and we are meeting in light of the request of the administration for an authorization for $366,278,000 for the improvement of Embassy security around the world.

It is my understanding that of that sum, there is only requested as an appropriation in the current year an item of $110,200,000 for immediate expenditure.

We will hear first from Ronald I. Spiers, the Under Secretary of State for Management, who is an old friend of the committee. We will have some questions to ask of him and his associates, and then it is my hope that if we can do all of that within the time that is available to us, the committee may be able to move to a markup on the request.

But first, let me turn to Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, let me congratulate you and Senator Percy for having persisted in looking at the security question, not just today, but for the past year, and the chairman for asking coincidentally for a GAO report on the situation which arrived just several days before this last tragedy.

I have a number of questions, Mr. Chairman, that I will be asking, but I would like to begin by setting the stage for what I hope will be the atmosphere.

Mr. Secretary, from my perspective, you are the wrong person to have in front of us. You are the right person to have in terms of your immediate responsibility, but I have a number of questions relating not only to Beirut but to other things that in my view have not been done in terms of Embassy security around the world.

That really does not land at your doorstep. The fact of the matter is, we all make mistakes. You make mistakes. The President makes mistakes. The State Department makes mistakes. I have made mistakes. We all make mistakes. And I think the American people understand that we all make mistakes.

But what they cannot understand, in my view, is what I cannot understand, and that is why this administration and this President cannot cut out all of the malarky and just acknowledge that he made a mistake, admit to the mistake, and assess some responsibility, and not pass the buck.

Why cannot we admit that we dropped the ball, that the administration dropped the ball, and say we are going to do everything we can, and with great specificity outline what it is we are going to do to make sure that we diminish the prospects of it happening again?

That is really all I am going to be asking for during this hearing. We just want some specific reassurance that the administration understands what it did not do, understands what mistakes were made. My problem is that the President and the spokespersons for the administration go through this rigamarole.

I understand the reluctance to take blame. No politician rushes to embrace his or her failures, myself included, but what worries me about it is, I wonder whether the President really believes it is like a kitchen. I wonder whether he really believes that it is something that nothing can be done about.

The frightening thing is, maybe he believes what he says, and if he does, that is really scary.

So, what I am going to be looking for today are some very specific answers to some very specific questions, and I acknowledge that you and your colleagues may not have all of those answers, so I will ask for some of them to be answered for the record, both in the open and closed hearing.

After spending a number of hours looking into this matter, I think there are three basic issues which we are going to have to address with regard to this supplemental authorization in the Congress and in the executive branch.

One is, regarding the Embassy bombing in Beirut last week, why did not the responsible officials heed the numerous warnings and have in place adequate interim security measures pending the completion of a more comprehensive plan? The failure is not one of national intelligence, I would argue, but rather of commonsense, to make physical defenses adequate.

Nor should we shrug our shoulders and complain about world terrorist movements. That is like saying that we should leave our doors unlocked here in the city of Washington because you know the crime rate is high anyway, or we should not deal with precau-

tions in major business, because you know how organized crime is. We have never been able to stop it.

The second area regards previous Embassy security measures worldwide, which is really more germane to precisely what we are going to be talking about here today. Why has the administration slowed down and cut back the programs originally presented to the Congress, and even failed to spend $6.5 million in funds already approved?

You know, bureaucratic lethargy we all understand, in all kinds of administrations, but it becomes fairly unacceptable when American lives are in jeopardy and have already been proven on past occasions, in the recent, immediate past, to be in jeopardy.

In the third area, regarding the pending urgent supplemental request, the question is, why has the administration requested an authorization of $366 million but an appropriation of only $110 million? Why should we not be doing whatever is necessary, and as fast as possible, to meet the clear and present danger?

We need to be sure that the funds we provide are spent with the urgency and efficiency that the threat warrants.

I am confident, and I am sure my chairman will agree with me, that the Congress will provide whatever request is even remotely justifiable as long as we understand what it is, but I think it is time for some accountability, not finger-pointing or buck-passing, but genuine accountability for the protection of our missions abroad.

Accordingly, I plan to propose an amendment at the end of this proceeding when we get to the authorization bill and/or the appropriations bill and the continuing resolution, which says that none of the funds may be spent until the President certifies in writing to the Congress either, No. 1, that the funds provided for the U.S. Embassy security are sufficient to provide adequate security at a level of risk which the President considers acceptable, or No. 2, that the funds are insufficient, but that adequate security at an acceptable level of risk could be achieved by specified additional funds.

Such a provision, I believe, would ensure accountability for implementing the kind of security which I am confident you and everyone else here believes is necessary.

I am anxious to hear your statement, and I have a number of very specific questions not primarily relating to Beirut, but relating to the worldwide effort to secure our various embassies.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MATHIAS. Just one more thing before you give us your statement, sir. Do you have with you anyone from INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research]?

Ambassador SPIERS. No.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I would anticipate that we might need someone from INR before this morning is over, and while you are testifying, if someone from your staff could make sure that we have someone from there present, we would appreciate it.

Ambassador SPIERS. I used to be from INR, but that is probably not good enough.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, you may be as current as anyone in INR, but I think we do not want to get hung up because we want to move along very rapidly. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD I. SPIERS, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT

Ambassador SPIERS. Senator Biden, let me say that I really appreciate the tone and spirit of your statement, and I hope that we can be responsive to the questions you have, although I have to say there are a number of things yet we do not know. But I have no hesitation in identifying those.

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, I am here to request an additional 1985 authorization of $366,278,000 for an urgent program to strengthen the security of our missions abroad. This is a direct and immediate response to the worldwide terrorist threat so evident in last week's vehicle bomb attack against our Embassy annex in Beirut.

Senator MATHIAS. Let me interrupt you just for clarification. This is a supplemental request, and it is not to impinge on any other funds that have been requested by the Department.

Ambassador SPIERS. The Department has also requested funds from OMB for 1986, and I think probably this will result in some revision, but no, it is not a change in any funds the executive branch has requested from the Congress.

Senator MATHIAS. I understand that there may be some battles in OMB.

Ambassador SPIERS. No, what we are doing is moving up some of the things that we have already submitted in our initial 1986 budget request to this more urgent category, so that this will probably require some kind of revisions in our 1986 budget.

Senator MATHIAS. That is exactly what I hope you will get into a little bit here. Are we robbing Peter to pay Paul?

Ambassador SPIERS. No, we are robbing the future to pay the present.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, maybe we do not want to do that.

Ambassador SPIERS. Maybe we do not.

Senator MATHIAS. This is an urgent problem, and it is an ongoing problem, and I hope you will lay it out for us so that we can understand exactly what is going to get cut. As Senator Biden suggested it is our sense that the Congress is willing to provide whatever is reasonably necessary for Embassy security and saving American lives.

But we want to know where it is coming from and who is going to get hurt by it.

Senator BIDEN. Let me put a slightly different twist on it if I may, Mr. Chairman. I do not ever want to sit here and have this President or any other President say on national television that the reason something happened was because the Congress did not give the President every single thing he wanted.

I do not want to ever be in that position. I want to be on record, if he wants the Moon, have him ask for it, and I will try to get it. But I do not want any more of this malarky about, well, the reason it happened is because of.

Senator MATHIAS. I think that is not the mood, but let us let the Secretary go ahead.

Senator BIDEN. Well, it is my mood.

Ambassador SPIERS. I think I understand your point, and I hope that I can deal with this adequately.

To continue, Mr. Chairman, the suicide vehicle bombing attempt of our Embassy annex in Beirut last week, the fourth such attack against U.S. facilities in the Middle East within the last 18 months underscores once again the vulnerability of U.S. personnel and facilities overseas to determine terrorist attack.

While physical security has been a high priority of the Department, we find ourselves at a clear disadvantage when fanatical adversaries are involved. In the face of this escalating situation, the Department of State has taken several actions to protect against future instances of terrorist attack.

For example, all posts have surveyed their vulnerability to vehicle penetration and taken actions to reduce it. These include such measures as requesting host governments to restrict traffic and provide additional guards, walls, fences, and gates.

But we clearly have to do more. We believe that given the significant increase in both the Department of State's physical security and antiterrorism program and its equally important security-related research and development efforts, we can do much to increase the level of overall security against known and projected terrorist threats.

We plan to implement this program in two stages. The major thrust of the first stage is to enable the Department to initiate more comprehensive physical security measures such as $20 million for perimeter barrier improvements at approximately 35 posts, $28 million for site acquisition development and support to accelerate construction of secure office buildings in high threat areas, $10 million to get more armored vehicles into the field, $11.2 million for Seabees, overseas engineers, and regional security officers to implement the security measures at our overseas facilities, $6.2 million for tactical satellite communications systems to ensure that even under the most severe conditions secure communications with our most highly threatened post are not interrupted, and $9.2 million to augment the inventory and support base of radios used by the Department's security agents and guards, and to provide voice privacy radios for the 50 most threatened posts worldwide.

We are also proposing several research and development programs totaling $6.6 million. In the past, the State Department has relied exclusively on the progress made by private enterprise and other agencies. However, our needs are different. Embassies are unique facilities that require extensive security while maintaining maximum passable, open access to the public.

Consequently, we have to explore new technologies and extend their applications to the field. In cooperation with all foreign affairs agencies and military commands, the Department of State will initiate a program of overseas training exercises to assure that emergency action plans for dealing with terrorist incidents and other types of emergencies are workable and up to date.

For this effort, we are requesting $1.3 million. I want to stress that this request is not simply a reaction to the bombing in Beirut. The Department of State has been working many months to identify its further essential security needs consistent with its growing

awareness of an increasingly larger threat which is not going to disappear.

Indeed, last July, the Secretary of State established a Security Advisory Panel consisting of retired Adm. Bobby Inman and several very distinguished members. The purpose of the Security Advisory Panel, which, incidentally, includes one member of the Senate, is to assess objectively the future requirements necessary for reasonable protection of our people and facilities overseas.

They are expected to make their recommendations to the Secretary before the end of this calendar year.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a list of the members of the panel and a statement of its mission.

Prudence requires that we must assume that terrorism is a new form of warfare which will be with us for the foreseeable future. We will entertain no thought of cutting and running, but we must recognize that our embassies abroad are on the front lines even as soldiers in wartime. Substantial time, attention, experience, and money will have to be devoted to this subject in the period ahead. We have 262 posts overseas, and I think every one of them is potentially vulnerable.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that we in the Department of State are very appreciative of the support that we have received from you and members of this committee in meeting increased demands for the protection of life and property abroad.

This committee has never denied us any resources for security. I hope and expect that this support will continue.

This concludes my formal statement, Mr. Chairman. My colleagues, whom I would like to introduce, and I, will be pleased to respond to questions you or other members of the committee may have.

On my right is Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Robert Lamb, who has the direct line responsibility for many State Department operations, including communications, information systems, buildings, and security.

On my left is Mr. Lorin Jurvis, the Associate Comptroller of the State Department, who is responsible for budgetary matters.

I have with me also our Director of Security, our Director of the Office of Combatting Terrorism, Ambassador Oakley, and others who have recently returned from Beirut.

We are prepared to proceed with trying to answer your questions.

[Ambassador Spiers' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD I. SPIERS

EMERGENCY SECURITY PROTECTION FOR U.S. PERSONNEL AND MISSIONS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am here to request additional 1985 authorizations of $366,278,000 for an urgent program to strengthen the security of our missions abroad.

This is a direct and immediate response to the world-wide terrorist threat so evident in last week's vehicle bomb attack against our Embassy annex in Beirut.

The suicide vehicle bombing attempt of our Embassy annex in Beirut last week, the fourth such attack against U.S. facilities in the Middle East within the last 18 months, underscores once again the vulnerability of U.S. personnel and facilities overseas to determined terrorist attack. While physical security has been a high pri-

ority of the Department, we find ourselves at a disadvantage when fanatical adversaries are involved.

In face of this escalating situation, the Department has taken several actions to protect against future instances of terrorist attack. For example, all posts have surveyed their vulnerability to vehicle penetration and taken actions to reduce it. These include such measures as requesting host governments to restrict traffic and provide additional guards, walls, fences and gates. But, we must do more.

We believe that, given a significant increase in both the Department's physical security and anti-terrorism program and its equally important security-related research and development efforts, we can do much to increase the level of overall security against known and projected terrorist threats.

We plan to implement this program in two stages. The major thrust of the first stage is to enable the Department to initiate more comprehensive physical security measures such as: $20 million for perimeter barrier improvements at approximately 35 posts; $28 million for site acquisition, development, and support to accelerate construction of secure office buildings in high-threat areas; $10 million to get more armored vehicles into the field; $11.2 million for Seabees, overseas engineers and regional security officers to implement these security measures at our overseas facilities; $6.2 million for Tactical Satellite Communications systems to ensure that even under the most severe conditions, secure communications with our most highly threatened posts are never interrupted; and $9.2 million to augment the inventory and support base of radios used by the Department's security agents and guards, and to provide voice privacy radios for the 50 most threatened posts worldwide.

We are also proposing several Research and Development programs totalling $6.6 million. In the past, State has relied exclusively on the progress made by private enterprise and other agencies. However, State's needs are different. Embassies are unique facilities that require extensive security while maintaining open access to the public. Consequently, we must explore new technologies and extend their applications to the field.

In cooperation with all foreign affairs agencies and military commands, the Department will initiate a program of overseas training exercises to assure that Emergency Action Plans for dealing with terrorist incidents and other types of emergencies are workable and up-to-date. For this effort we are requesting $1.3 million.

I want to stress that this request is not simply a reaction to the bombing in Beirut. The Department of State has been working many months to identify its further essential security needs consistent with its growing awareness of an increasingly larger threat which is not going to disappear.

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My colleagues and I will be pleased to respond to questions you or the members of the Committee may have.

SECRETARY'S ADVISORY PANEL ON SECURITY OF U.S. MISSIONS OVERSEAS

The panel is chaired by Admiral Bobby Inmann, Chief Executive Officer of MCC and former Director of the National Security Agency and former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Panel members are:

Ambassador Anne Armstrong—Chairman of the President's Foreign Advisory Board, former Counselor to the President and Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

Ambassador Lawrence S. Eagleburger—currently with Kissinger & Associates Inc., former Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

Lt. General D'Wayne Gray—Chief of Staff, Marine Corps.

Mr. Robert J. McGuire—Chief Executive Officer, Pinkerton Inc. and former Commissioner of Police, New York City.

Congressman Daniel A. Mica—Chairman, House Subcommittee on International Operations.

Senator Warren B. Rudman—Member, Senate Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary.

THE PANEL'S CHARTER

I. We need to reevaluate how the Department can better fulfill its responsibilities to protect its facilities, personnel, their families and national security information abroad.

The number and size of our diplomatic and consular posts and foreign affairs agencies personnel stationed abroad have grown dramatically since the Second World War. This growth continues with few and minor exceptions. We have sought to accommodate the range of U.S. Government activities that seek to locate abroad.

Given the intensified security threat the panel should examine the size, composition and location of our 257 posts to determine whether this policy remains valid.

We cannot protect every embassy against every threat. The costs—human as well as material are too great. Our policy has been to protect our facilities and people against specific, identifiable threats. As a consequence when a new threat arises, our employees are subject to risk until we have had time to institute proper measures and often we appear reactive as an institution.

The Panel should determine specifically, if this is a better balance between reasoned security measures, operational effectiveness and our obligations to protect our people.

In acknowledging our responsibilities to protect employees, we have differentiated between terrorist acts and criminal activities. To the person whose life or family is threatened at a remote and dangerous post, this distinction is likely to be academic.

The Panel should examine our responsibilities to protect employees against common crime.

Our security measures have been concentrated on chanceries and other office buildings because they are subject to the greatest threat. We have done less to protect residences. Government-owned housing is often treated differently from privately-leased housing. We need to consider more thoughtfully questions relating to residential security.

We need the Panel's judgment on whether the U.S. Government should have different security concerns for employee's homes than for office buildings.

In today's world many of our foreign national employees risk their lives and well being by working for us. We need outside thinking of mission responsibility for these loyal men and women.

The Panel should examine our obligations to them.

II. Having considered the responsibility of the U.S. Government toward its employees we need also to review the obligations of the employee to the Government. Should an employee be required to serve in dangerous or threatened posts?

Traditionally the Foreign Service and other foreign affairs agencies have taken pride in their discipline and willingness to serve at difficult and hazardous posts. Never before have the dangers been so grave and direct. The Panel should be asked to examine whether these new and more hazardous conditions have meaningfully altered our psychological contract with our employees. If this has occurred, what are the implications for our recruitment, assignment policy, and the total psychic and financial compensation package? What new training needs does this create?

III. Another area that needs review and "outside" input is our obligation to protect American businesses and private institutions operating abroad against threats to them as Americans or symbols of the United States.

Today the Office of Security offers some informal advisory sources for private industry in the United States and responds to inquiries on threats. This service is provide unevenly. SY is developing a program to strengthen and institutionalize these arrangements. Our security support of American business will continue to be limited to unclassified, advisory activities unless we change present policy.

Abroad this assistance is provided to those firms knowledgeable enough to seek us out. The Panel could help us achieve a clear consensus on our responsibilities for American citizens, businesses and other institutions abroad.

The adequacy of present programs to protect foreign missions and their personnel situated in this country needs comprehensive rethinking. The United States makes

heavy demands on foreign governments to protect our missions. When they seek reciprocity, our response has not always been satisfactory.

Abroad, we expect foreign governments to accept our judgment as to whether there is a threat. In the U.S. we insist on making the determination of their peril for them and we make it narrowly.

Protection of foreigners in the United States is a quilt work of responsibilities. The Secret Service protects visiting Chiefs of State and Heads of Government. State's Office of Security generally protects their wives, husbands and other accompanying adult family members. State Security has responsibility for protecting all other visiting cabinet members, if there is a specific threat.

The Uniformed Division of the Secret Service has responsibility for protecting foreign missions in the Washington, D.C. area. Elsewhere it is the responsibility of local jurisdiction.

For New York, the Department is acquiring from Treasury the authority to reimburse local jurisdictions for extraordinary expenses in connection with protection of foreign missions to the U.N. We have legislative authority to establish a similar program for other consular facilities and people but as yet no money to fund the program.

Our effectiveness in meeting these responsibilities has a direct bearing on the willingness of foreign governments to protect our personnel. There are a number of Federal agencies involved in providing this protection. State alone cannot rationalize this situation. The Panel should make recommendations to the Secretary for followup with other agencies.

IV. What are the resource implications of our security responsibilities?

We expect this Panel to come forward with a program with vision—one which will lay the foundation of the Department's security philosophy for the next generation. For a program of this scope resources cannot be the deciding factor. But the Department's means are modest and funding must be taken into account. The Panel should identify, in general terms, the costs of their recommendations to the Secretary.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, Senator Mathias went down to make a quorum in one of his committees, and will be back very shortly.

Let me begin the questioning by asking you why, if you can tell us, over the past several years has OMB apparently, from our information, apparently downgraded, cut back, and stretched out the expenditures of dollars?

Let me give you a few of the facts as I am told them, and ask you to respond. Of the 167 posts requiring physical security improvements, State requested money for 70, and OMB cut that to 35. While 50 posts now lacking them are supposed to be given physical access control projects over the next 5 years, State requested funds for 10; OMB cut that to 2.

While State's original request for new buildings and renovations at 13 "of our threatened posts to meet minimal levels of antiterrorism and antivehicular standards and where the planning of new construction is already well advanced," OMB allowed only funds for 10 projects, and only for preliminary work, this despite State's claim "these represent projects which can start relatively quickly and which only need sufficient funds, and in a few cases additional design development work."

Only $28 million of the $174 million originally requested was allotted. Although 50 posts in short-term leased office buildings "have not received the required internal public access control improvements," OMB disallowed State's request for 10 projects to provide "the minimum level of physical security protection."

OMB cut the number of new regional security officers in half, from 104 to 51. OMB cut the armored vehicular program in half,

only 60 of the 120 needed, despite likely cost savings from earlier large quantity purchases.

OMB disallowed the entire $12 million requested for 310 new Marine guards to establish 45 detachments. OMB disallowed $17 million from what is called a classified R&D program to stay abreast of current developments in acoustics, electronics, and optical transmissions and receptions unique to embassies.

OMB disallowed a mere $420,000 for threat alert enhancement and an interagency terrorist computer library. OMB cut $1.7 million for new security measures at the main State Department building, despite the claim that the building faces "a very real domestic vehicular bomb threat." Reportedly the cut was made because of bureaucratic disputes over whether GSA should pay for such improvements.

The list goes on. Is OMB on our side or on their side? Who does OMB work for?

Ambassador SPIERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the whole history of the State Department-OMB relations in the security area. This year is the first year that I have had contact with the subject, and it may be that some of my colleagues can give you greater information.

As I listened to your question, it seemed to me that what you were talking about was this request that we are now addressing and not the past request.

Senator BIDEN. In reviewing the Department's security supplemental request this week, OMB refused to request immediate appropriations for $256 million of the $366 million you requested. The full amount, however, is requested for authorization, as I understand it.

Ambassador SPIERS. Right.

Senator BIDEN. And the list that I read off are the most significant cuts that OMB has made. Now, I will put anyone you may have with you on notice that I am going to go back in this hearing over the last 4 years of what OMB did not let you have, and try to figure out why it occurred. But let us talk about this request.

Ambassador SPIERS. We drew up in the State Department what we considered added up to a rational, reasonable security program, which is what we were directed to do.

In conversations with the White House and the Office of Management and Budget, for reasons with which I am not totally familiar, the decision was made for authorization of the entire amount that we requested, but to limit the appropriations request to $110 million, which represented what we felt in our best judgment was urgently needed, and we looked at this closely.

We could do a reasonable job of obligating and beginning to spend, particularly on long lead-time items before January, when the White House has planned to introduce a supplemental for the rest of the money.

So, these are not disallowed funds. They represent a decision made at the highest level of the executive branch not to request an appropriation of the whole amount at this particular time.

This is not something that leaves us in the State Department uncomfortable. Where we would be uncomfortable is if the appropria-

tions were not made later on. As a matter of fact, we see some virtue in taking a little bit more time on some of these things.

Senator BIDEN. So these cuts, as I have been told, were not cuts really by OMB then. Do you agree with that?

Ambassador SPIERS. Yes, these were jointly identified when it was decided that what we would focus on was the realistic possibility of getting an appropriation without creating turbulence in other areas that I am just not competent to talk about.

What we focused on were the high priority things that we thought we could get moving on now, particularly in the personnel area. It takes time to get and train security officers, and we did not want to wait until the beginning of next year to begin that.

On the buildings problems, we cannot start spending this money between now and the beginning of next year.

Senator BIDEN. Why?

Ambassador SPIERS. We have asked for funds for design and engineering for site acquisitions, but we have not asked for funds for actual construction. There is no way we can begin to obligate money for construction until that preliminary work is done.

So, the decision was made to try to limit the appropriation request to that kind of expenditure.

Senator BIDEN. Well, is the reason why the appropriation request is one-third the authorization request cosmetic and political? Is it not fair to say we need $366 million but we are only going to take $110 million? Why are you doing it in that way?

Ambassador SPIERS. Look. We have a clear decision in the White House that we will go for the additional appropriation.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I do not understand why you did not just ask for it now.

Ambassador SPIERS. I really cannot answer that question. I think it relates to broader considerations, including some views of some Members of the Senate.

Senator BIDEN. Who?

Ambassador SPIERS. Our responsibility is to try to identify our total needs and the moneys that we think we can rationally spend now. One of the first things that I was asked when we put together this $366 million was, are you asking for something that you cannot spend right away, and I had to agree, yes, it is not something that we can spend right away.

Senator BIDEN. You could not spend right away $12 million for 310 new Marine guards?

Ambassador SPIERS. No, because the Marine Corps has told us that they cannot provide those people now. They are going to be able to do it in the new year, is my understanding. Let me ask Bob Lamb to talk to that specific problem.

Mr. LAMB. Yes, sir. We have a commitment from the Marine Corps to provide us 100 additional marines in this fiscal year and the remaining 207 next——

Senator BIDEN. Do you mean to tell me you need 310 marine guards now and the Marine Corps tells you they cannot find you 310 now?

Mr. LAMB. We think we need 307 over the next 18 months.

Senator BIDEN. Why do you not need them immediately? If they had them now, could you use them immediately?

Mr. LAMB. Sir, we do not have the logistic base in the field to support them.

Ambassador SPIERS. You have to have housing and so forth.

Senator BIDEN. I want to make this clear. I just want to narrow this down so I know who is making what decision.

Ambassador SPIERS. This does not constitute a problem for us.

Senator BIDEN. But it does for me.

Ambassador SPIERS. All right. But you are asking me, Senator, about the thing. We have had substantial contact with the Marine Corps on this issue. We have identified what our requirements are. The marines are really pressed in this area.

One, the marine security guards take special training courses. They are specially recruited. We have to provide facilities, housing, transportation, all kinds of support for them, and this is something that we have to phase in.

If they turned to us tomorrow and said, here are 312 marine security guards, I think we would have a problem.

Senator BIDEN. If I were the President, and I turned to you and said, look, here are 310 new guards who will work 24 hours a day, you can have all the money you need, you can have them immediately, do you mean to say you could not figure out a way in a month to use them? What are you talking about?

Ambassador SPIERS. I think you would create a lot of problems for us. Suppose something happened and we were putting these people into places where security was inadequate, where we had not thought through the communication supports that are required for them.

If you were President, Senator, a prospect which I gather is not completely out of the question, I would tell you——

Senator BIDEN. Well, let me put it another way. Here we are absent those marines.

Senator MATHIAS [presiding]. You will not get his vote that easily. [General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. Here we are, absent the marines. Let us just take Lebanon. What are we using? We are using contract guards.

Ambassador SPIERS. We have 14 marine security guards, and marine security guards, as I am sure you understand, under the agreements between the State Department and the Marine Corps, have responsibility for the internal security of our official buildings, and the security of the grounds, perimeter security.

Security outside property owned by the U.S. Government is always provided by the host government, although we have in recent years trained and paid for and hired our own guard forces, normally people that are nationals of the local or host country. I myself think that is a sensible arrangement.

The problems that we had in Lebanon last week were not problems that related to the local guards.

Senator MATHIAS. Let me break in here just a second. You referred to them as contract guards. What exactly is the arrangement in Lebanon?

Ambassador SPIERS. I will ask Bob Lamb or David Fields to deal with the arrangement.

Senator MATHIAS. The general rule is that the host country provides the external security?

Ambassador SPIERS. That's correct.

Senator MATHIAS. What was the situation in Lebanon?

Mr. LAMB. To supplement the external security provided by the host country, we had carefully chosen and trained basically a paramilitary force, a Lebanese paramilitary force that were in the employ of the Embassy, and there are about 90 of them altogether. Thirty-four of them were deployed on the west Beirut chancery site.

Senator MATHIAS. When you say trained, what was their training?

Mr. LAMB. The training, sir, was about a half month of paramilitary training by U.S. military by our own training specialists from the State Department.

Senator MATHIAS. So they were not 90-day wonders. They were 15-day wonders?

Mr. LAMB. Yes, sir; we had to move fast, but our training people who worked with these people said they were one of the best paramilitary units that we had like this anywhere in the world.

Senator BIDEN. Could the marines not have done the same exact job they were doing?

Mr. LAMB. No, sir.

Senator BIDEN. Why not?

Ambassador SPIERS. That is not the job of the marines.

Senator BIDEN. I didn't ask that.

Ambassador SPIERS. Well, I think you would have a lot of problems with host governments if the United States were to deploy its own military forces, and the marines are part of our military forces in their territory and surrounding areas of our embassies.

I mean, we would have problems with that in our country, and we have a responsibility under the Vienna Convention to provide that kind of security. So do the local governments in the countries in which we are represented.

Senator MATHIAS. I understand that it is not a good thing internationally to have small military forces roaming around within the country, but let us get back to this Lebanese force.

You said they had 15 days of training. What was their level of education?

Mr. LAMB. Sir, I cannot speak to that. They were very carefully selected, and they had had some military experience in the past.

Senator MATHIAS. Can you advise the committee for the record as to what the level of education of these people was?

Mr. LAMB. Yes; sir. I can.

[The information referred to follows:]

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF LEBANESE PARAMILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO U.S. EMBASSY

The individual educational level within the Lebanese paramilitary is somewhat varied. To categorize, the personnel we utilized in East Beirut had completed education equivalent to our high school level, although a number had attended or completed schooling at college level. In West Beirut, very few, if any, of the paramilitary personnel for our Embassy had completed the equivalent of high school.

A training team from the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security and the Regional Security Officer trained the guards in the use of firearms, night sticks, handcuffing, hand-to-hand defensive tactics, vehicle and package search techniques, body search techniques, use of metal detectors, access control, and the rules of engagement (i.e., when to shoot and when not to shoot).

Senator MATHIAS. I think all of us have been to Lebanon, and we understand the kind of situation there. Again, as the Secretary has indicated, this is a worldwide problem. It is not just a Middle Eastern problem.

And so i think we need to look into the question of where there are similar, as Senator Biden has called them, contract forces at other embassies, and what the nature of those contract forces is, because Embassy security is not just a physical problem.

It is just not concrete and bars. There is a human element to security as well as a physical element, and I think the committee is interested in both sides.

Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, let us stick with the Lebanese security force that we hired and trained. What kind of security checks were done on each of the individuals?

Mr. LAMB. There were background checks done on each of the individuals, sir.

Senator BIDEN. But you are aware, are you not, and correct me if I am wrong, that it is impossible to do a full background check on them? Is that not correct?

Mr. LAMB. Sir, we had questions about the reliability of the force, but in fact these questions proved to be invalid. Two of these Lebanese guards, as you call them, gave their lives to protect the American employees at the Embassy.

Senator BIDEN. I understand that, and I would like to avoid the hyperbole. Let us just talk about what the situation is.

Ambassador SPIERS. I cannot talk specifically about Lebanon, but I can talk specifically about posts where I have been assigned.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I want to stick specifically with Lebanon. With regard to Lebanon, I sit on the Intelligence Committee and spend some time looking at reports and watching and asking about security background checks.

Is it not true that you cannot fully vet any of those people?

Mr. LAMB. I think there is a question about the validity of any background checks. We do the best we can. We did the best we could in Lebanon, and we have no reason to believe that these were not adequately done.

Senator BIDEN. The best you could. Would that be sufficient for security at the White House? Based on the background checks you were able to do on these Lebanese folks, would you be willing to stick any one of them at the gate at the White House?

Mr. LAMB. We followed the same processes in Lebanon that the Secret Service would follow in providing the background checks here. Yes, sir.

Senator BIDEN. So in fact you are satisfied that you are able to garner enough information in the background checks of these individuals to be as confident as you would if you were checking out an American national or a British national or a French national?

Mr. LAMB. Our information is not yet complete on what happened in Beirut, but as of now we have no reason to doubt the loyalty of our employees in any way, sir.

Senator BIDEN. That is not the question. With all due respect, that is not the question.

Ambassador SPIERS. Are you talking about their competence as guards, or the security?

Senator BIDEN. I am talking about little things like whether or not they may be part of a terrorist organization itself. Little things like whether or not you are unable because as you go into neighborhoods for background—I am going to request at the Intelligence Committee and hear a detailed accounting of each of the security checks on each of the individuals that were put forward.

And if you are telling me on the record that you are satisfied that they were sufficient, that they in fact—whether or not the guards who were killed or the guards who were there performed their duty.

If you are telling me that the background checks you were able to run on the Lebanese in Lebanon are in fact sufficient to give you confidence that they, A, are not part of a terrorist group themselves, B, can be counted upon as well as any other background check can tell you, and C, give you a full picture of what that person's background is, that is one thing.

Is that what you are telling me?

Mr. LAMB. Sir, I am saying that these are men who gave their lives in some instances to protect our Embassy, and I think it is unfair to them to raise this sort of question about their loyalty to us.

Senator BIDEN. I wish you would not act like the President. I am not impugning the integrity of each of these people. I am asking you a question, because next time around you have not changed the situation.

But we have sitting over there now those same guards, and I want to know on the record so I do not get stuck again, in fact, are you, the State Department, saying to us that you are confident you have sufficient information on the consequences of background checks run on the Lebanese that none of the people are part of terrorist organizations?

I am not implying that any of them were. I want to know whether you know that much.

Ambassador SPIERS. I do not know that anybody can give you that kind of guarantee. Let me tell you, Senator, that I have had enough experience with these things and have seen the kind of things that you look into and the kind of ways you avoid ambiguous situations so that I have—certainly when I was Ambassador in Turkey and Ambassador in Pakistan, where they are both high levels of threat, where we relied on exactly the same kind of guard forces.

I knew what kind of checks were made. I had a pretty high level of confidence. Nobody can guarantee you that there cannot be a terrorist infiltrator there, and I cannot guarantee you that about the White House guards.

Senator BIDEN. I am not looking for guarantees. I am looking for things like, did you give them flutter tests?

Ambassador SPIERS. What is that?

Senator BIDEN. Did you give them lie detector tests?

Ambassador SPIERS. No, we do not do that for State Department employees.

Senator BIDEN. But they are not American citizens, and they are asked to protect American citizens. You are telling us to rely upon, to the best of our ability, a group of foreign nationals to protect

American citizens in an area where 300 or close to that have already been killed.

Ambassador SPIERS. Now, we do have the internal protection of the buildings and the properties on which the U.S. citizens are working, the marine security guards. But they are not protecting the areas, the surrounding areas or the public roads around the Embassy.

Senator BIDEN. Why not the gates?

Ambassador SPIERS. I do not know whether marine guards are there. You have marine guard posts, and I do not know exactly what they were now in the East Beirut annex.

Senator BIDEN. Did you want the 90 marines to go home?

Ambassador SPIERS. Yes, this was a decision that was taken while I was out of the country, and I do not know all of the discussion that went into it, but I have to tell you frankly, having looked over it, that if I had been a participant, I would have concurred in the decision.

That is a marine force whose principal responsibility is not the guarding of American Embassies. That is the marine security guard force.

Senator MATHIAS. Let me raise a different kind of question. Again, looking at the Lebanese situation, what assurance did we have that the Lebanese guards might not have been called away by order of the Lebanese Government somewhat similar to the situation which happened in Tehran, where the external security melted away in the face of a mob threat?

Ambassador SPIERS. There was no guarantee of that except that the guards work for us. They do not work for the Lebanese Government, those people. You understand that there are two types of forces around the Embassy. There are three perimeters. There are Lebanese Army forces, Lebanese police. There are contract guards.

Senator MATHIAS. The Lebanese Army, and this would be true in any embassy situation, the local government, the host government could order that protection withdrawn at any moment as a political decision.

Ambassador SPIERS. That is correct. Then you have Lebanese nationals who are employees of the U.S. Embassy, as are many employees of the U.S. Embassy even inside the building. And then you have the marine guard force, whose responsibility is the protection of the building and the property on which that building exists itself. That is a traditional way of doing this. I think it has been successful.

Senator MATHIAS. That is inside a compound?

Ambassador SPIERS. That is inside a compound. That is where the responsibilities of the marines begin and end.

Senator MATHIAS. Has there been any consideration, and I am thinking now about that middle perimeter that you have just described, the contract security, has there been any consideration to doing what I believe the British have done on some occasions, which is to retain the services of American nationals who may be, say, retired NCO's, retired special forces personnel? They would be in a civilian capacity.

Ambassador SPIERS. I understand what you mean. My understanding is that the British people are members of active service Royal Marines. They provide bodyguards for Ambassadors.

Senator MATHIAS. They do it as we do it.

Ambassador SPIERS. The Germans do what you are talking about. I think that they have border guards. No, actually, they are also active duty people. No, I am not aware. Our security people may know something that I do not know, that active consideration has been given to recruiting American nationals to perform this kind of perimeter function.

Senator MATHIAS. It is dull duty, No. 1.

Ambassador SPIERS. It is dull duty. When you are at the gate, you need the local language, because you need to communicate with the people. You need to understand the surroundings. I think that the present system, the present situation by and large is a sensible one.

Now, I understand the Senator's criticisms, but I am not in a position totally to accept what he says.

Senator MATHIAS. I hope that as the senior official of the Department concerned with management, you will give some consideration to this.

Ambassador SPIERS. I think that this is one of the things that would be worth having the Inman panel specifically give us some judgments on.

Senator MATHIAS. I would like to have them address it.

Ambassador SPIERS. We will do that.

Senator MATHIAS. You are faced with dull duty, and you need the ability to have somebody who can shoot but who is not trigger happy. That means someone with mature judgment, and the kind of people that I am talking about are experienced in making judgments if you get retired NCO's, that kind of person.

I do not think we should be above looking at the experience of other nations. Our problem is not unique. From the black hole of Calcutta onward these problems have been experienced.

Ambassador SPIERS. That was a British experience.

Senator MATHIAS. Yes, that was a British experience. They have been coping with problems of this sort longer than we have, and we should not be above taking advantage of and profiting by their experiences.

Ambassador SPIERS. Well, I think Senator Biden has raised a question that I am sure a lot of thought has been given to, but I really would like to say for the record because it is those Lebanese guards who prevented this tragedy from being a lot worse, and if it had not been for them, it would have been a lot worse.

These questions can be raised in an abstract way, and I have to tell you that there is no way that I can make this guarantee that Senator Biden was referring to, but I think our experience has never once indicated a problem in that area.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I would suggest that we go into executive session after a time. I understand that Ambassador Oakley of the Office of Counterterrorism and Mr. Fields, who is the head of the Office of Security, are here, and we can pursue exactly some of the security steps that were taken. I think that might be useful.

What you are talking about is not only the expenditure of $366 million, but it is the development of a program which is going to require infrastructure. Once these programs are in operation, I assume they will run on their own momentum. You will have the physical security. You will have the trained personnel and all the rest of it, and this will be self-perpetuating as most government establishments are once they get running.

But what are you going to do to get geared up to this program? Are you going to have to borrow from existing personnel, existing programs, assign people from doing current tasks to doing new tasks?

In other words, I guess what I am asking you is what kind of priority is the Department going to give to this?

Ambassador SPIERS. We are going to have to do a combination of all of them. Senator, for me this is not a new problem, and sometimes I think that the reason I am in the job that I am in——

Senator MATHIAS. You are a survivor.

Ambassador SPIERS [continuing]. Which I did not volunteer for, no, is because one day I unloaded on the Secretary of State all of the frustrations that I had, particularly in the security area.

The nonresponsiveness of the State Department, the internal management difficulties, the difficulties of getting decisions, that was a mistake which led him to say, OK, let us see what you can do, and I came back here at the end of last year, and the first job that I have is putting together a competent team to deal with it. That takes a little time.

That is why we have Assistant Secretary Lamb, who arrived about the same time I did. Deputy Assistant Secretary Fields is probably one of the best people that we could find in this area who has been here a few months. Ambassador Oakley, who has been here a few weeks.

And that is the starting point for dealing with this. We know of the kind of management problems we have had in this area, and I do not have any—well, I have equally high priorities, but I do not have any higher priorities.

One of the things that we have to do is to improve the resource base of the State Department and the personnel base of the State Department.

It is not something that is done overnight. We are going to have to hire new people. We are going to have to get some of the better people that are now working in other areas into this program.

We have to constantly make sure that our Ambassadors are keenly aware of this threat. You know, not everybody has been posted in high threat areas. This kind of thing can happen any place tomorrow.

I mentioned earlier that we have 262 posts. There is not one of those where I can tell you that this is not a possibility, and I am not even sure that, you know, East Beirut is that much more of a possibility than Dublin or elsewhere.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, the American minister in Paris was shot at as he stepped out of his front door. As you say, there is no sanctuary in the world.

Ambassador SPIERS. This is a massive problem, believe me. It is a massive problem, and it is one that is going to require an awful lot

of management skill, resources, and people. It is not a traditional function of the State Department, and I think that all of us who are in this area are keenly aware of our responsibility, and very, very interested in doing something about it.

Senator MATHIAS. Are you telling us that the responsibility from this time on—of course, the responsibility ultimately flows to the Secretary and the President, but internally within the Department that the responsibility will rest on Ambassador Oakley and Assistant Secretary Lamb?

Ambassador SPIERS. On me. They both report to me, and I have a coordinating responsibility here. I also have responsibilities for personnel, money, and a lot of other things. But these are the two people who are primarily going to have to ensure that our policies and procedures in this area are up to what they should be.

Senator MATHIAS. What about at the posts around the world? Will there be some security officer who will bear the principal responsibility?

Ambassador SPIERS. One of the requests that we are making is for an increase in personnel, although since Mr. Lamb and I have been on this job, we have increased the number of our regional security officers by 11 percent, but here again we want trained people, we want good people.

Senator MATHIAS. At every post?

Ambassador SPIERS. I think that every post has to be covered by this.

Senator MATHIAS. I think there is no substitute for having it at every post. As we have just said, there are no sanctuaries. You cannot assume that Paris, Rome, or Bonn are going to be safer than other places.

Senator BIDEN. I have a silly question. Why now? Why are we starting now?

Ambassador SPIERS. Well, if I started next year, you could ask me the same question, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. No, this is not a criticism of you personally. We were told that that whole process was in train in 1981. What has been going on?

Ambassador SPIERS. You know, it was in train, Senator. I was posted in London in the late seventies, and the program had started then. I think that we have had some coordination problems within the State Department, and I think while you were out I said that this is what led me to be a very frustrated Ambassador overseas.

Senator BIDEN. So things were not working correctly?

Ambassador SPIERS. No, and I cannot guarantee that they are working correctly now, but we are going to work on it.

Senator BIDEN. Who was responsible prior to you?

Ambassador SPIERS. My predecessor was a man named Jerry van Gorkom, who was a Chicago businessman. Bob Lamb's predecessor was Tom Tracy, who is now retired from the State Department. We all have predecessors, but you know, it is clear to me when I came back to take this job that one of our highest priorities was to get ourselves straightened out in this area. We have spent a lot of effort in this.

Senator BIDEN. From your past experience, which is broad, and your present job, do you believe that the bombing in Beirut, the most recent one, had anything to do with the failure of intelligence capability?

Ambassador SPIERS. Well; you know, I was once Director of Intelligence in the State Department, and maybe do not view intelligence—we have had dealings in the Intelligence Committee.

As a magic wand I think that intelligence has a particularly hard job here, and I think we are dealing with a phenomenon that most of our countrymen really have not focused on yet. I think we are dealing with a kind of revolutionary Shiite movement that most people do not understand the history of.

I think it is a little bit different from the kinds of things that we have been used to, the PLO, the IRA, and other revolutionary movements. I think that we are going to have to develop new techniques for finding out what they are doing, but it is an awesome task, and you will not find me critical of our intelligence community on this.

Senator BIDEN. By the way, nor am I. Let me put the question another way.

On the Intelligence Committee, we have consistently and vigorously supported more money for HUMINT, more money for analysis, and more money for counterintelligence.

Ambassador SPIERS. And it should be done.

Senator BIDEN. Are you aware of any depletion of HUMINT analysis or counterintelligence capability in the Middle East generally, or in Lebanon specifically over the last 4 years?

Ambassador SPIERS. Depletion?

Senator BIDEN. The implication, we are being told, is that something was drawn down, that there were not sufficient capabilities because we have depleted our intelligence.

Ambassador SPIERS. I am not aware of that, but you ought to put that question to someone who has more contemporaneous familiarity with it than I.

Senator BIDEN. I will. But you have been there in that region a long time.

Let me ask you another question, and this will be to the head of security or whoever is appropriate. Other than identifying the precise vehicle and the precise time, is there anything that intelligence could have provided that was not provided?

Ambassador SPIERS. Well, theoretically, you could talk about infiltrating groups that may or may not exist. That is something that I don't want to talk about much in open session.

Senator MATHIAS. We will reserve that question until we adjourn for executive session.

Senator BIDEN. Well, maybe you misunderstood the question. I am not looking for how we do or do not infiltrate groups. My question is this. We already knew, the intelligence community already told State that there were threats, you were aware of the threats. You were aware of the threats relating——

Ambassador SPIERS. But this didn't come from the intelligence community.

Senator BIDEN. It came from the newspapers.

Ambassador SPIERS. On September 8, there was a call from an unidentified man to Agence France Presse that said the Americans in the Middle East were going to be struck in retaliation for our vote on September 6 of the U.N. resolution.

Senator BIDEN. But subsequent to that, the intelligence community—well, maybe we are getting into classified things. I will defer.

Ambassador SPIERS. I think our intelligence people are working very hard on this problem. It is a very difficult one.

Senator BIDEN. I think there is no failure of intelligence in the Middle East. It is a failure of recognizing what the problem is in the Middle East by the President.

Senator MATHIAS. Let us look at the request for the fiscal year 1985 supplemental.

On perimeter barrier improvements, the request is for $40,478,000. The appropriation is for $20,478,000. Can you not physically spend the total authorized amount? What is the reason for not wanting to go forward with the whole program?

Ambassador SPIERS. Let me ask my colleagues about that. But perimeter barriers take time to design, to acquire the materials for, particularly if they have to be imported, and I guess this represents a judgment, the specifics of which I cannot speak to, as to what is reasonable between now and the time Congress reconvenes.

Mr. LAMB. Yes, sir. Some of these threats are changing on us and we are not going to rush right out and spend this money, just to spend the money. We are spending the money to provide better security at these posts and we want some of this money to take care of threats that are going to be developing next year.

We do not know where they are. We do not know what precisely is the nature of them. But we can see a growth in our security requirements, and we would like to be ready to address them when they come.

So, by delaying half of that money for 6 months, we do not feel that we are weakening our security posture.

Senator MATHIAS. What about the request for the marine security guard program? You asked for an authorization there of $12,534,000, but you do not want any of it in cash.

Mr. LAMB. Sir, we need that in January. We need it when we come in with the next urgent supplemental on this. We cannot use it right now. There are enormous logistics and training requirements to get the pipeline started for that kind of program.

Ambassador SPIERS. Our request is for $780,000 for vehicles for existing guard units.

Senator MATHIAS. If you did go to a program such as that which is utilized by some other nations—and I cite the British and Secretary Spiers cited the Germans regarding the employment of American nationals—then you would need a further supplemental on that?

Ambassador SPIERS. That would begin to get much more expensive, because then you would have to provide housing for them and transportation.

Senator MATHIAS. But not more expensive than the kind of experiences we have had in Beirut.

Ambassador SPIERS. No. But that assumes that I accept the supposition that you are better off than with local guard forces, which I am not entirely prepared to accept.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I have only asked you to lay that before your experts.

Ambassador SPIERS. And we will do so.

Senator BIDEN. Don't worry about the money. We will give you the money.

Senator MATHIAS. It would be cheap. It would be a bargain if you can avoid another episode.

Ambassador SPIERS. I totally agree with that. I am not looking for ways to save money. These people over there are my colleagues, people that I have worked with for up to 30 years. I have as much interest in their security and well-being as anybody else in the world.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Ambassador, we are not implying that you don't. We just want to make sure that you understand our point. I have a kind of feeling that you may be like many administration officials in many adminstrations, and that is between a rock and a hard spot in terms of what you want and what you are told you can ask for, and what you are told you can get.

Ambassador SPIERS. It is a fact of life.

Senator BIDEN. But it doesn't have to be a fact of life. It doesn't have to be a fact of life in this area. We spend $366 million around here, on much less urgent and significant things.

Senator MATHIAS. And the committee takes notice of the fact that you personally served in some very important and significant and difficult posts, and that you must, out of your experience, have a full personal estimate of the nature of this problem.

Ambassador SPIERS. Yes, sir; I think I do.

Senator MATHIAS. So any of the comments that we make are not directed at you personally. But we want the administration to be fully aware that this committee is not going, No. 1, to be reluctant to provide the resources and, No. 2, to be reluctant to criticize the failure to utilize these resources.

There is a question of exposure here that I think needs to be examined, too. Has the Department taken any steps to look at the most dangerous posts? Now, we have just all agreed that there is no diplomatic post in the world that is an absolute sanctuary, whether you are in London, Paris, or anywhere else, such as Stockholm or Copenhagen. Any place, problems can arise anywhere.

But obviously, in given moments of history, some places are going to be higher risks than others. What kind of review does the Department make to classify those high-risk areas and to reduce the number of American personnel there to the absolute minimum to carry out the function? And what about their dependents?

Ambassador SPIERS. I will let Mr. Lamb deal with the specifics, because he is essentially responsible for this. We do have a system. I think it is orderly. All posts are categorized in an A, B, C, D, E system and that largely determines the priorities for attentions and funds, and some of these things change from time to time.

On dependents, very often there is a conflict between the State Department and the chief of mission on this issue, and it is a subject which generates a lot of emotions. I get very emotional about it

myself. My view is that a lot of autonomy has to be permitted to the Ambassador in making judgments on levels and types of people that are permitted at posts.

Naturally, as a post goes into a high threat category, we raise these issues. Many people in the Foreign Service—and I have to tell you, frankly, that I am one of them—if I went to a high-threat post and my wife wanted to accompany me—and I am not talking about children now—and she was willing to accept that and I was willing to accept it, then you get into a discussion of whose judgment is correct on it, and it is a very touchy question. It is one we spend a lot of time on, but it is one in which I find there are not very easy answers.

Senator MATHIAS. There are no easy answers. But it does seem to me that the Department has to have some philosophy, some guidelines.

Ambassador SPIERS. We do.

Senator MATHIAS. That when a post becomes a clearly high-risk situation, that then the exposure should be limited, and if you have people who can be brought home without crippling the function of the post, they ought to be brought home so as to limit the exposure.

Ambassador SPIERS. There is no question about that, and we do do that.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I am not being solicitous when I say that I think you are really a good man. My problem is that there are several voices, it seems to me, that come out of the administration. It seems to me that we cannot have it both ways.

For example, you have stated here today and the chairman has repeated what is the obvious; that no diplomatic post is a sanctuary. The implication is that this could happen, this same kind of car bomb thing could happen anywhere in the world with equal facility as it happened in Lebanon.

I see you shaking your head yes, and you agree to that.

Ambassador SPIERS. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Yet, in explanations given by the President and Secretary of State over the last three incidents, they say this could not have happened without the acquiescence of the Iranians and Syrians because of the fact that they control the area. That is the only way they could get the dynamite; that is the only way they could load the trucks; that is the only way they could get through the areas.

And the President of the United States stands on television and tells the American people over three successive occasions that the exact same modus operandi was used; that this could not have happened were it not for the acquiescence of other governments. And then they go into this whole thing, which happens to be true but maybe is a non-sequitur, about terrorist governments. We are not dealing just with terrorist organizations.

So I ask you the following question. Who is right? You or the President?

Ambassador SPIERS. Senator, that is a heck of a thing to ask me.

Senator BIDEN. That is right, it is.

Ambassador SPIERS. Let me put this to you. There was a bomb that went off in the Capitol. Does that imply the acquiescence of the U.S. Government and the Senate of the United States?

I am not sure that I recognize the quotation that you attribute to the Secretary. I think that there are some indications in the past of acquiescence and assistance by governments, but I don't think that is something that you can induce. I think that has to be deductive reasoning, not inductive.

Senator BIDEN. I happen to agree with you. And I will, for the record, locate those quotations where my firm recollection is that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State said, when asked by me and others in other hearings who done it, they said we don't know for sure who done it, but we know it had to be associated with other governments. And why do we know? Because physically it would not be possible to do the following.

That is my distinct recollection. I will find that information and submit it for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

On October 24, 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz said in briefings to Members of Congress following the Marine barracks bombing: "Iranian elements in Lebanon operate from behind Syrian lines and are allied with Syria . . . Syria must bear a share of responsibility for any Iranian actions in Lebanon, whether or not Syria knew of any specific terrorist plans." (Washington Post, October 25, 1983)

On November 22, 1983, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger blamed Syria for the barracks bombing. As reported in the Christian Science Monitor of November 23, 1983: "U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger said yesterday that the U.S. Government holds Syria responsible for the recent attack that killed 239 American servicemen in Lebanon. In a press conference statement that appeared to go beyond earlier United States pronouncements, Mr. Weinberger said those behind the October 23 suicide truck bomb mission were "basically Iranians with the sponsorship and knowledge and authority of the Syrian Government."

Senator BIDEN. But you would acknowledge that that is not very sound reasoning?

Ambassador SPIERS. No; I would say I would have to disagree with that.

Senator BIDEN. So would I.

The other question that I have, Mr. Secretary, is the following. Now, I am not being facetious with it. Why are we in Lebanon, other than that we don't want to be run out? What is the substantive reason as to why we are in Lebanon, and what is the rationale for us being physically where we are within Lebanon?

The third question is what functions are the personnel at our American Embassy in Beirut performing that are deemed to be absolutely essential?

Ambassador SPIERS. Let me deal with the three parts of your question in turn. On the first part, let me say that I am not the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, but I follow these things pretty closely. I think that there is a definite function for our Embassy there. Lebanon, whatever its internal difficulties is, is a sovereign country that we recognize that we have relations with traditionally.

I have to say that I think Ambassador Bartholomew has done a remarkable job in maintaining contact and communications between the United States, the Government of Lebanon, and the vari-

ous factions, whether it is Jumblatt, Barri, Sheikh Pierre, Fadi Fram, or the rest of them.

I think that is a real value to the United States. I think he plays a role that is useful.

Senator BIDEN. So contact is one of the functions?

Ambassador SPIERS. Contact is an important area. It is important to keep the United States informed about what is going on. It is a traditional function of any embassy, and the reality of our policies really depends upon the accuracy of the information we receive.

As to why we are in East Beirut, the decision was made last May and it is a decision that I participated in. As you know, our Embassy there was bombed last April. I was still in Pakistan when that happened. We moved in with the British while we were reconstructing an Embassy in another place.

That involved an awful lot of difficulties. And West Beirut, of course, is a place where the government's writ did not really run. It was a kind of a warfare area, a battleground.

The Ambassador, I think quite rightly, raised with us the collection of these difficulties that we were occupying British properties, that they had had to close off The Corniche, which is a major thoroughfare, that it was unsafe for our people, and recommended that we move to East Beirut. We made that decision. There was a total consensus on it. I don't remember any disagreement whatsoever.

We certainly surveyed the place from a security standpoint. We had agreement on what needed to be done. There was a strategic decision made which certainly can be criticized in hindsight, but which I am willing to stand by.

Senator BIDEN. I am not criticizing the decision. I just want to know what the rationale was.

Ambassador SPIERS. That the move should be made even before all of the security emplacements had been finished in the Awkar Building, but it was essentially a security-related decision because we were moving out of the area of Beirut that generally embassies are located in.

We are not the only ones who have done it. The French have done it, the British have done it, I think other embassies have done it.

Senator BIDEN. Was there any concern about insult to the Moslem community?

Ambassador SPIERS. Yes indeed. And one of the reasons what we have in East Beirut is the Embassy annex is because of that. The real Embassy is still located in what is called the Porfin Complex. But we have minimized the number of people that we have there.

Senator BIDEN. That is what I am trying to get at. The strategy is that you want to be able to have a presence within the Moslem and also the Christian areas?

Ambassador SPIERS. That is correct.

Senator BIDEN. Now, when you made the move—and I guess it is more a question for your security director—I asked this question on the first day. I wondered why the gates were not in place. Now, obviously, you thought they were important or essential. Why didn't you just use dump trucks or vehicles? Was it just something that was overlooked?

Can anyone look me in the eye and say we just didn't think of it, or we thought of it and it was a bad idea?

Ambassador SPIERS. Let me deal with that, Senator, because this is certainly one of the major factors in our current investigation. Until we get all of the reports, I am not going to make final judgments on this.

We still have to talk to our security man who was there, who was being Medevac'd back to the United States today. I do not know when we will be able to get to him. There are some questions. Apparently, that gate was lying there for maybe up to a couple of weeks, waiting for the concrete to cure, and it appears that the contractor was dilatory on it.

What the Embassy really did about that, we have to find out. We do not know yet, and I am not going to make final conclusions about it until I do.

The other question is why, if there was an inevitable delay in that gate which would have stopped the car, if that gate had been in place that car would not have gotten through.

Senator BIDEN. I agree.

Ambassador SPIERS. Although you can also make the case that if the man that was determined to get us knew that that gate was there, he would have found some other way. But in any case, there is some other question about why some kind of barrier, temporary barrier or truck, the kind of things that we placed around the State Department when I first got back here—or the White House—wasn't in. I don't know the answers to those questions.

It may have been that they were weighty considerations.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I can tell you that the answer that I was given the day it occurred was that embassies are not fortresses. We have to make them look available. That is bull.

Ambassador SPIERS. This is always a consideration for an ambassador, and it is not all bull.

Senator BIDEN. If we can put them around the White House in the freest, most open country in the world and not seem to be ashamed of it, I don't know why we can't put them in the middle of a battle zone.

Ambassador SPIERS. Well, that's all right. But first you have to recognize, one, this road was a public road. It was not part of the Embassy compound. There are residencies on it, and it is one thing to put cars around the White House, but let me take our Embassy in London where I was posted for many years. I think if we tried to close off Grosvenor Square, you would have real problems.

Senator BIDEN. But Grosvenor Square is not in the middle of a war zone.

Ambassador SPIERS. No, but let me tell you, two blocks from Grosvenor Square, when I was posted there, somebody parked a Volkswagen in front of Selfridge's and blew the place to smithereens.

Senator BIDEN. That is right, and that could happen right outside of this building. But we keep acting like Lebanon is not an exception, like Beirut is not an exception.

Ambassador SPIERS. Obviously, Beirut is a much higher priority for us because of these factors. The fundamental decision we made was to get out of West Beirut, despite some of the political disad-

vantages. That was a security-related decision, a fundamental security decision.

Now, why a month and a half after that move was made, only 75 percent of the security, the agreed security installations have been made is a subject that we don't have an answer to yet. I know Ambassador Bartholomew very well. He is one of our most energetic people. I think that what he accomplished in that period of time is remarkable. The tragedy is that gate.

Senator BIDEN. Let me ask you another question. Can you contemplate a circumstance where we could be in a country, in Beirut in particular, within Lebanon, where you would have to say to the President of the United States or the Secretary of State there is no reasonable way we can protect our personnel. Therefore, Mr. President, you must consider whether or not you want that same number of personnel exposed.

Ambassador SPIERS. I can conceive of such a circumstance. I don't think it has ever happened, and I don't think that Beirut qualifies. I think that the functions of the Embassy there are too important. We have plenty of people who are prepared to go there, even in the face of what has happened twice. I think it has a continuing function, and we can protect ourselves reasonably.

It really is the things that were done that prevented that from being worse.

Now, there are some things that you or I could conceive of that you can't protect.

Senator BIDEN. What are we doing today in Beirut in terms of security? Literally, today.

Ambassador SPIERS. I have a whole catalog of these things that I don't have in my head. Let me ask someone to address that.

Senator BIDEN. What is in place at this very moment as we speak?

Ambassador SPIERS. I am reminded, Senator, in response to your last question that there was a case. We moved out of Tripoli because there was no security there.

Senator BIDEN. Pardon me?

Ambassador SPIERS. We moved out of Tripoli because there was no security there.

Senator MATHIAS. I think Senator Biden was out of the room when we discussed the question of exposure and the question of the limitation of the number of people in the high-risk posts.

Senator BIDEN. I guess I was also out of the room when we talked about the Lebanese guards having prevented it from being worse. That may be true, but I thought it was the British.

Ambassador SPIERS. There are a lot of newspaper accounts to that effect.

Senator BIDEN. I didn't get that from the newspaper accounts. I got that from the CIA. Maybe they are wrong.

Ambassador SPIERS. Well, they are wrong. Mr. Fields just returned from there, and I think he can give us the most up-to-date information.

Mr. FIELDS. What is in place, Senator, at that annex building now——

Senator BIDEN. Wherever our people are. Are there any in the annex, any American Embassy personnel at the annex now?

Mr. FIELDS. There is an investigative team working at the annex doing forensic work, searching through the rubble to find out the details of the blast. There is at that site two vehicles blocking the road at both ends of the road; that is, there are four vehicles.

When I left the last Sunday, the last time I saw that annex, there was a jeep at the end of the interior chicane with a 106, I think it is, Howitzer recoilless rifle pointing right down the road.

Senator BIDEN. Do you think that offends the Lebanese Government?

Mr. FIELDS. I didn't really think about that, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Good. I am glad you didn't.

Mr. FIELDS. We asked for, and since I have left I am told that we have received it—at the Ambassador's residence, we asked for two APC's [armored personnel carriers] from the Lebanese Armed Forces to block the roadway in front of the Ambassador's residence. I asked that a vehicle—and it was done—be parked inside the gate at the residence, and that no vehicles enter that residence.

Senator BIDEN. With the concurrence of the Lebanese Government?

Mr. FIELDS. Well, the interior of the property, I didn't ask for the concurrence of the Lebanese Government, but for the outside, yes.

Senator BIDEN. Did anyone in the Lebanese Government suggest to you, or anyone in the State Department, that that was an unreasonable request?

Mr. FIELDS. Not to me. Perhaps to others.

Senator BIDEN. I would ask that question to anyone at the table.

Ambassador SPIERS. I wouldn't have thought that they would regard it as unreasonable, given the circumstances.

Senator BIDEN. Well, you are blocking an outside street, you are interfering with traffic, you are doing all the things we didn't do before.

Ambassador SPIERS. But we did block the street in front. We interfered with traffic, and the Lebanese Government had agreed with that, and I guess even the residents had acquiesced in it, unhappily.

Senator BIDEN. Is that where all our personnel are now?

Mr. FIELDS. We have some people living in residences in East Beirut. We did a survey with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Defense Attaché, and a security officer toured the areas where all the Americans reside in East Beirut. There was an agreement to pinpoint those residences for the Lebanese Armed Forces. They would throw a permit of security around areas, not around specific residences, and run patrols through those areas and also put additional intelligence people on the street in those areas.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I want to make clear for the record that there is no way in the world that you are going to prevent somebody a half mile away, with a high-scope rifle or a mortar or anything else, but there are ways to prevent bombs, trucks loaded with bombs from getting close enough to blow up buildings.

That is physically possible, I would argue.

Mr. Secretary, I believe you are quoted in the Post, which is never wrong, as we both know——

[General laughter.]

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. As telling the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the decision to withdraw the 90 marines was in response to "a political problem rather than a specific security problem." That seems at odds with what was said earlier.

Ambassador SPIERS. I don't remember exactly what I said, but what I was saying was that general political considerations have to be taken into account as well. Here you have a Marine Force that was tied down in the Eastern Mediterranean in a function that really isn't its principal function, rather than simply a decision on the narrower security grounds.

I don't think anybody disagreed with the withdrawal of the Marines or that it was expected that they would be withdrawn.

Senator BIDEN. But the President didn't say that. On February 14, 1984, the President of the United States said—and I quote: "U.S. military personnel currently with the MNF will remain on the ground for the protection of the remaining personnel, including the diplomatic community." Somebody changed their minds. I guess the President changed his mind.

Ambassador SPIERS. I have to say that this is not something that I was involved in, but I think that all of our security people felt that there was no reason, combined with a move to East Beirut, the training of the guards, the hiring of a contract force, why that was essential for security reasons.

Senator BIDEN. Just as we, believe it or not, understand your frustration and—quite frankly—anguish, having served with many of those people who have been put into such jeopardy, you can understand our frustration when the President of the United States tells us that the purpose of marines after February 15—and this is after we already had many of them killed and after we had officially withdrawn—was to stay there to protect the personnel, and then for us to find out 80, 90, or how many of them were, came home.

Ambassador SPIERS. But you recognize that that is why we were posted in West Beirut where there was no possibility of the Lebanese Government providing the kind of security for our people that was warranted, and that this kind of took place in phase with the move out of there.

Senator BIDEN. It seems to me what is implicit in the move and the change in attitude with the move was not only was the physical facility more secure, that is, more open in the sense that you could cordon off the perimeters rather than the way it was in West Beirut—and I would agree; were I sitting there, I would just say in the face of it having no security expertise, yes, it sure makes a lot of sense.

But the other thing that underlies it all, that runs through all of the administration's assertions, was also—and it seems to be part of what I would argue would be the lapse in security—was the mindset that now we are on the good guys' side, now we are in the part where the good guys are. Well, if not the good guys, the bad guys aren't there. And this notion that in order for things like what happened in the past to happen again, they have to be done implicitly with the acquiescence of the personnel that are in charge of the area where they happened—not the personnel, but the government or the quasi-government or the militia.

That runs through every statement that this administration makes, which is why I said 4 days ago, and I am criticized for it, that there is an appalling naivete that runs through this administration's view of the Middle East, this notion that seems implicit in everything. I am not laying this on you, Mr. Secretary, but just to get it off my chest, this notion that somehow the only way you can have truck bombs and car bombs and massive destruction of U.S. personnel and/or property is if there is aquiescence, collusion, and/or a direct involvement of the government or the host area.

Ambassador SPIERS. But on the face of it, that is incorrect, Senator.

Senator BIDEN. Why?

Ambassador SPIERS. Let's take London.

Senator BIDEN. I am talking only about Beirut, only the Middle East. I am talking about only that policy.

Ambassador SPIERS. Well, frankly, I don't agree with that, even in Beirut. But it is clear that in no place is that necessarily the case. Terrorists can operate, and the fact of their being able to operate does not imply government collusion. Government collusion may be there, but the fact of terrorism——

Senator BIDEN. I am trying to figure out why, at a minimum, there was a psychological mindset that downgraded the urgency for security once you moved from West to East.

Ambassador SPIERS. Senator, you know, I think our people were quite security conscious and certainly we are, but also there is a natural phenomenon that operates in the direction that you say. It happens everyplace in the world, and one of our jobs is to keep our people alert.

Senator BIDEN. But there is no place in the world in the recent past that, within 1 year, you have had over 250 marines killed by the same method; within the same year, the Embassy blown to smithereens; and then it happened again.

It is not like you had a hiatus of 4, 5, or 6 years of quiescent times. This all happened within a year. How can you insist or anyone else insist on comparing it to any other situation in the world and its impact upon human nature? It just boggles my mind.

Senator MATHIAS. At this point, let me take a line from Senator Biden. We must try to learn to protect the future from the lessons of the past.

You referred to the bomb that exploded in the Capitol which did extensive physical damage. Fortunately, no one was killed or wounded. But I note that the authorization request contained $280,000 for shatter-resistant film for windows at the main building of the Department of State and $1.4 million for perimeter security upgrade at the Department of State.

You have deleted the request for an immediate appropriation for those items. Now, we have learned here in Washington that there is not any guarantee. The Department of State certainly would be a high risk among Government buildings. Why aren't we going ahead with the protection for the Department of State at this time?

Mr. LAMB. We are going ahead with some of the protection already. In fact, sir, next week we are starting work on Delta barriers at the entrances into the Department.

Senator MATHIAS. On what? I'm sorry.

Mr. LAMB. On the Delta barriers, the controls for the vehicular traffic into the basement of the Department. These were things that we thought were better deferred until after the beginning of the new year, the beginning of next year. We really didn't think we could get moving on them that quickly. It involves some work with GSA.

Senator MATHIAS. So the contracts couldn't be let, the architects couldn't be employed, the engineers couldn't be retained?

Mr. LAMB. Sir, we simply split this. We didn't say that we are not doing the second part of it. We are planning to come in with a very urgent supplemental with the next session of the Congress.

Senator MATHIAS. My question is, Is it delayed? Is any part of this program, whether it is the Department of State itself, or whether it is in Beirut, or whether it is anyplace else, is any of it delayed because of the lack of cash, the failure to request appropriations?

Mr. LAMB. We looked very carefully at whether we were going to delay any of these urgent security measures significantly by putting off portions of it, and we did not see any delay.

Senator MATHIAS. Now, let us lay it on the table. OMB has a right to its opinion, but OMB isn't always right. You only have to look at the current deficit to figure that something went wrong somewhere, and OMB is as good a place to lay that blame as anywhere else.

So OMB doesn't have to be the "be all and the end all" of this thing. Their advice is valuable and we are glad to have it, but we don't have to take it.

Now, something happened on the way to the forum here. On September 24, Secretary Shultz talked about a $372 million package. We are down now to $366, so we lost $6 million somewhere, and we are only talking about an appropriation of $110 million.

I don't think Senator Biden or I want to see any money spent unnecessarily, but if there are some false economies here that are going to slow down the security program anywhere in the diplomatic establishment, I think we want to know about them, and we will make our own judgment as to whether or not those economies should be adopted or whether the money ought to be provided to save American lives and to save the United States from further damaging blows of the kind that we have now had repeatedly, three times in Beirut.

So your testimony is that there will be no savings in time as a result of a lag in the request for appropriations?

Mr. LAMB. Yes, sir.

Ambassador SPIERS. It is the best judgment that we can make.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I would suggest we go into executive session.

Senator BIDEN. May I ask a few more questions in open session?

Senator MATHIAS. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, are you at liberty in open session to lay out for us what at this point the game plan the State Department has and the administration has for Embassy arrangements and number of personnel that you are going to have in Lebanon from this point on or in Beirut?

Ambassador SPIERS. No, I would be prepared to talk about that in closed session.

Senator BIDEN. OK.

The second question, if you can do it in open session, is this: Has there been any thought given, while you are rebuilding, reworking the security arrangements, to downgrade just by giving home leave to personnel so that you significantly diminish the number of people you have to protect in very unprotected circumstances?

Senator MATHIAS. The Secretary really has answered that.

Senator BIDEN. Oh, he has? Maybe he could just respond again very quickly.

Ambassador SPIERS. The answer is yes.

Senator BIDEN. All right. That is quick.

Can you, Mr. Secretary, or anyone else, tell us whether or not—can you explain to me what is the procedure that you go through at State in requesting security moneys internally first, the same as at the Justice Department which I am very familiar with? Do you go before OMB and make your case and have a hearing, in effect? Are there transcripts kept of that?

Ambassador SPIERS. No. I can describe the procedure. But none of them are recorded.

Senator MATHIAS. If they were, they were shredded. [Laughter.]

Ambassador SPIERS. They wouldn't let us have the money for shredders. [Laughter.]

Senator BIDEN. My guess is that they would be doing the shredding, and not you. [Laughter.]

Can you tell us this; are my numbers and figures correct when I say that of the money that has thus far in this administration been appropriated for security, that $6.5 million previously approved to date has not been spent—can you tell me whether that is accurate or not?

Ambassador SPIERS. For Beirut?

Senator BIDEN. No, overall, for worldwide security.

Ambassador SPIERS. Let me ask Mr. Jurvis to respond.

Mr. JURVIS. Senator Biden, I think the $6.5 million you are speaking about is part of the money that was appropriated by the Congress for security in Latin America and in Europe in 1982. You gave us 2 years to spend it. Because of the capital nature of some of the projects, we asked to have it extended for another year.

So it is correct that that $6.5 million of that supplemental has not been spent. It is planned. We needed more time to do it because of the physical arrangements that had to be made to put in place public access controls, construction, that sort of thing.

Senator BIDEN. For the record, what has been made in State security requests by OMB for each of the past 5 years?

Mr. JURVIS. We have that for you, sir.

Senator BIDEN. Can you tell me what they are?

Ambassador SPIERS. In 1985, our initial Department request was $130.8 million. The OMB passback was $109.2 million. The Department appealed $14 million. A congressional submission was $123.2 million.

In 1984, we requested——

Senator BIDEN. Did we give you all you wanted of $123 million?

Mr. JURVIS. Yes. Congress has always given us everything.

Ambassador SPIERS. We just cannot say anything negative about Congress' response to this. Not that I would want to.

In 1984, our initial request was $118 million. The OMB passback was $108 million. We appealed $3 million of that and it was granted.

In 1983, our request was $119.8 million. The passback was $115.8 million. We did not appeal it, so that was our congressional submission.

In 1982, we requested $123.5 million. That was totally allowed.

In 1981, $84.3 million. OMB passback, $82.9 million. We did not appeal.

That is the last 5 years.

Senator BIDEN. OK. Thank you very much.

If you would bear with me just for a moment, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MATHIAS. While you are composing your thoughts, let me ask this question. You requested $3,170,000 both in an authorization and appropriations for training. Where will that training be accomplished?

Mr. FIELDS. Senator, those positions and the money to fund those positions would provide us with training teams to send overseas to train our employees in various aspects of security; also, to work with our local guard forces to ensure that they operate to the maximum to train chauffeurs, drivers who work at our embassies and drive our personnel around, that sort of training.

Senator MATHIAS. My question is, Where is this training going to happen?

Mr. FIELDS. Most of it is going to happen overseas on location?

Senator MATHIAS. The 25 positions that are contemplated, these are people who what?

Mr. FIELDS. Those would be security agents that we would hire here in the United States, train ourselves, and then make into trainers to send overseas to train Foreign Service and other Government personnel.

Senator MATHIAS. So it would be an in-house program?

Mr. FIELDS. Yes, sir.

Senator MATHIAS. That was my question.

Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, what is different today in bringing about this supplemental request from now until the end of the year that is different from what the situation was in February, at the beginning of this year?

Ambassador SPIERS. Let me try to thread my answer to that. Requests for funds take place within the context of certain political realities. I think that the Beirut situation has changed that reality. A lot of these things are things that we intended to request, have requested in connection with our 1986 budget.

Somebody, somewhere, made the judgment rightly or wrongly that that is the pace at which these requests should be made. When the Beirut incident happened, I think it was clear that the political context in which these things had been considered—and, you know, while we regret the tragedy, we welcome the opportunity to get some of these resources earlier on.

I think that that has also stimulated some new thoughts. There is money in here for a research and development program that I mentioned. This is not something that the State Department has

ever done, and it is something that I have had a great deal of interest in. These are our problems and we ought to be trying to help create an industrial base to deal with them.

Senator BIDEN. What I really do not understand is the judgment exercised by State and/or OMB as to the political realities. It will be a year this October that a group of marines were blown away. It will be less than a year, it will be a year in December when the Kuwaiti Embassy was attacked.

We still have a handful of Americans, including diplomats, being held hostage right now. No countdown, no calendars, no days, no anything, in the Bekaa Valley. And yet it took another incident to change the political climate apparently to bring this about.

I cannot fathom that you needed any more inducement politically than what none of us wanted—I am not implying you or anybody else wanted it—than we got with the combination, all within a year, of the marines being blown away, the Kuwaiti Embassy, and American citizens being held captive in Lebanon.

You know, it makes me wonder about our ability to make assessments of the political climates in other countries if the conclusion is the political climate in this country wasn't ready to accommodate another $110 million. I am not asking you to comment on it, but that is our frustration here.

I will not ask any more questions, but will sum up by saying that from my perspective—and what really genuinely angers me is, with the exception of you, you are the only person who I have spoken to thus far—and I have spoken to other State Department personnel, intelligence personnel, and listened and observed administration personnel talking about this—there seems to be, with the exception of you and your colleagues here today, an incredible sort of arrogance about not acknowledging not only the tragedy of this, but the mistake of this.

That is why I am angry, because I have been led to believe, and maybe I wasn't diligent enough, that in fact there was no need for any supplemental, that whatever you needed you all asked for. I don't know whether the chairman has a different view, but I just assumed that not only were you asking for everything you needed, but you probably were asking for maybe even a little more than you needed, just to give yourselves some room.

And now here we are, after another bombing, coming up here asking for a supplemental, without anybody having said officially thus far, by the way, this is somewhat out of the ordinary; I am sorry we didn't ask for it before.

Do you understand the frustration?

Ambassador SPIERS. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator BIDEN. Thank you for bearing with me.

Senator MATHIAS. I have one final question on the request. Your threat analysis operations involve seven positions, but none of them would be funded under this supplemental appropriations request. I think that bears on Senator Biden's concerns about how you gear up, because there is no guarantee that there may not be another attempt made on an American Embassy, somewhere, someplace, between now and the first of the year.

Mr. LAMB. Sir, we have taken a number of steps in the last year to increase our threat analysis and the speed with which we get

threats out to the post. We thought that we would have trouble just gearing up quickly enough to fill those six positions.

Ambassador SPIERS. Senator, all of these things come together. You know, when you get more people, you have to hire them, you have to take them away from someplace, you have to replace them, you have to provide housing and space for them.

I can understand the feeling that this is something we may not be able to accomplish between now and January. I have the problem of staffing the whole State Department and security is not the only problem.

Senator MATHIAS. Well, I suggest that we go into a brief executive session at this point to discuss some of the questions that could not be resolved in open session. Before we do that, let me just say that the chairman of the committee, Senator Percy, has indicated his intention to remain on this subject in a continuous way, and the Department should be on notice that he will be calling full committee hearings to look at not just this particular request at this particular moment, but the global kind of problem that we all face here.

Senator BIDEN. Before we adjourn, I did not ask the obvious question about the amendment I said I am going to introduce. Is there anyone in the administration who can speak to whether or not there is the opposition to the amendment that I mentioned at the outset, which I will refer to as the accountability amendment, which would require the President to certify what you, in fact, just certified here; that the funds provided by the U.S. Embassy security are sufficient to provide adequate security at a level of risk which the President considers acceptable; or, if it is not at the level, the President would tell us how we want?

Would you give us an administration position on that?

Ambassador SPIERS. Senator, I will have to go back and get that for you.

Senator MATHIAS. Very well. On the motion of the Senator from Delaware, we will go into executive session. We will ask you, Mr. Secretary, if you will join us in the back room. And then we will resume open session and mark up the bill.

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene immediately in executive session.]

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